STRATEGIC THINKING*
国際教養学部
AIBE4770
コース情報
担当教員: 浅野 哲人
単位数: 4
年度: 2024
学期: 秋学期
曜限: 月2, 木2
形式: 対面授業
レベル: 400
アクティブラーニング: あり
他学部履修: 可
評価方法
レポート
授業内期末試験
授業期間中
中間試験
授業期間中
その他
(compulsory) group presentation
詳細情報
概要
Prerequisites: (a) Sound knowledge of calculus; AND (b) IBE200 Principles of Microeconomics [Note: If you do not meet the prerequisites but still want to enrol in this course, please talk to (or email) the instructor prior to the first class. In general, you are not allowed to enrol in the course, but the instructor may give you a special permission if your background is deemed sufficient. Not obtaining a permission is a sufficient reason for receiving an F grade.] Game theory is a way of thinking about strategic situations. Most decisions you make are not made in isolation, but involve interaction with others. This course discusses some strategic considerations to take into account when making your own choices. We will learn game theory so that you can formally — using a mathematically precise and logically consistent structure — examine situations of potential conflict: situations where the eventual outcome depends not just on your decision and chance, but the actions of others as well. Various applications of game theory will be drawn from economics as well as other disciplines.
目標
Students who successfully complete this course should be able to: 1. Explain how game theorists think and approach strategic situations; 2. Apply game theoretic analysis to examine the real world situations; AND 3. Recognise the underlying structure of simple games used in other courses.
授業外の学習
Preparation of class materials (30 minutes). Work on questions from class and assignments (120 minutes) Review class lecture (40 minutes)
所要時間: 190 minutes per lecture.
スケジュール
- Introduction and math refresher. All students who intend to enrol in this course, please endeavour to attend the first class (from the beginning).
- Maths continued. The extensive form.
- Strategies and the normal form.
- Beliefs, mixed strategies and expected payoffs.
- Rationality and common knowledge
- Dominance and best response
- Rationalisability and iterated dominance
- Application of rationalisability and iterated dominance (1)
- Application of rationalisability and iterated dominance (2)
- Nash equilibrium
- Group presentation (1)
- Application of Nash equilibrium (1)
- Application of Nash equilibrium (2)
- Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
- Group presentation (2)
- Backward induction, sequential rationality and subgame perfect (1)
- Mid-semester examination (timing is subject to change)
- Backward induction, sequential rationality and subgame perfect (2)
- Subgame perfect and its applications
- Random events and incomplete information
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Lemons, Auctions
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (1)
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (2)
- Signalling
- Wrapping up
- Group presentation (3)
- Final Examination PLEASE NOTE: Present syllabus may be subject to revision.
教科書
Watson, Joel (2013). Strategy, 3rd edition, Norton.
参考書
書籍情報はありません。